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This report presents the Blueprint for Coverage
in New York, a project undertaken by the
United Hospital Fund and The Commonwealth
Fund to explore options for achieving universal
health insurance coverage in New York.  We
developed approaches that would address the
specific characteristics of New York’s 2.8 million
uninsured and establish a more secure 
foundation of coverage for all New Yorkers.
We explored a combination of voluntary public
program reforms, premium subsidies to make
coverage more affordable, a new group 
insurance purchasing mechanism, and employer
and individual mandates to reach these goals.
While these changes could be made individually,
when implemented together they would
achieve universal coverage and improve 
coverage options for the insured to provide a
more stable health insurance system for all
New Yorkers.  We present the estimated costs
and coverage impacts of these expansion 
scenarios as prepared by The Lewin Group
using its Health Benefits Simulation Model.  
Our approach is designed to be 
implemented as a series of “building blocks”
with which reforms would first be made to
public programs, to increase participation rates
and make affordable coverage available to a
greater share of low- and moderate-income
persons.  Specifically, we would simplify public
program rules to enroll those who are currently
eligible but uninsured, expand Family Health
Plus (FHP) eligibility for childless adults, and
allow low-to-moderate-income New Yorkers to
“buy in” to FHP with income-related premium
assistance.  With the introduction of the buy-
in, New York would implement a new statewide
purchasing mechanism—an “Insurance
Exchange”—that would provide individuals
with a choice of additional coverage options at
group rates.  These changes would lay the
foundation for other reforms. 
• Public Programs. Simplification and
expansion of existing public programs with
three components:
– Simplification of public program rules to
ease enrollment and renewal in order to
increase participation rates among 
eligible but uninsured persons;
–Expansion of Family Health Plus eligibility
for childless adults to 150 percent of the
federal poverty level (FPL); 
–Subsidized buy-in to FHP so that 
affordable coverage is available to more
moderate-income New Yorkers (up to 300
percent FPL);
• Insurance Exchange. Implementation
of a new purchasing entity for individual 
purchase of coverage at pooled group rates;
• Employer Requirements. Two varia-
tions of assessments on employers with 10 or
more employees that do not offer health
insurance: 
– A modest employer assessment of $400
per worker per year;
– An employer “pay-or-play” assessment of
8 percent of payroll or a credit toward
this assessment for coverage offered (on
average, the assessment would be $3,200
per worker);
• Individual Mandate. A requirement
that all residents purchase health insurance
coverage, with income-related premium
assistance.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS The modeling
results indicate that implementing the 
simplification, FHP expansion, and FHP buy-in
together (“combined public program changes”)
would achieve only a one-third reduction in the
uninsured, and leave two million uninsured New
Yorkers.  In addition, the availability of 
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Executive Summary
The following policy changes were modeled:
subsidized coverage through the FHP buy-in
would improve the affordability of coverage for
currently insured low-to-moderate-income 
individuals and families, compared with what is
currently available through employer-sponsored
insurance (ESI) and non-group insurance.  As a
result, there would be a significant shift from
ESI and non-group insurance into this new 
coverage option.  We therefore explored 
mandatory coverage scenarios, including require-
ments for employers to offer coverage, contribute
financially toward the cost of coverage, or both—
as well as mandates on individuals to purchase
coverage.  Ultimately, an individual mandate is
required to achieve universal coverage (see
Figure ES-1).
The costs of such reforms are borne by 
government, employers, and families and are 
distributed differently depending upon the 
specific approach. Scenarios that do not include
any employer requirements would result in 
significant shifts out of employer-sponsored 
coverage into new subsidized options available
through the Insurance Exchange, without any
new sources of financing for this shift.  This
would place the burden of new spending on the
state and families, and ultimately result in 
significant net savings to employers (see Figure
ES-2).* 
As this analysis makes clear, only policy
options with individual mandates achieve the
goal of universal coverage. Among these options,
those that require some shared responsibility
from employers achieve greater equity among
employers, limit erosion of employer coverage,
and reduce state fiscal responsibility. Two
options, therefore, bear special scrutiny: 1) the
combination of public program expansions, 
individual mandate, and a modest employer
assessment, and 2) the combination of public
program expansions, individual mandate, and
employer pay-or-play.
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Figure ES-1. Coverage Shifts by Policy Scenario (millions)
Note: Coverage shifts for Pay-or-Play, Individual Mandate, Pay-or-Play with Individual Mandate, and Modest Employer Assessment with Individual Mandate
scenarios include coverage shifts for combined public reforms (administrative simplification, expansion of FHP to 150% FPL, and FHP buy-in).
Numbers presented in this chart may not sum to totals and may not match numbers in the text due to rounding.
*Note that—while not shown
here—the modeling assumes that,
over time, savings to employers
would be passed back to workers in
the form of wage increases.
However, the cost estimates presented
here do not include the wage effects
associated with these policy changes.
(See Appendix B in the full report for
a discussion of The Lewin Group
modeling assumptions.)
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UNIVERSAL COVERAGE: INDIVIDUAL
MANDATE AND MODEST EMPLOYER
ASSESSMENT This option for universal coverage
is modeled closely on the 2006 Massachusetts
Health Reform law.  This policy scenario
includes public program reforms (as described
above), a modest assessment on employers of
$400 per worker for firms with more than 10
workers, and an individual mandate.  Our 
modeling results indicate that this combination
of policy reforms would:
• Cover 2.4 million uninsured New Yorkers,
achieving a 98 percent coverage rate (see
Figure ES-3).  
–The individual mandate would compel a
significant increase in take-up of available
public and employer-sponsored coverage,
driving the reduction in the number of
uninsured.  
–The employer assessment, because it is
small, would not provide an incentive for
many employers to newly offer coverage,
and so there would be no direct impact
on coverage rates from the assessment
itself;  
• Result in a shift of people from employer and
non-group coverage into public programs and
the Exchange, due to the availability of 
subsidized coverage;
• Raise $400 million in revenues to offset the
state’s cost of the coverage expansions;
• Result in a net cost of $4.1 billion (see
Figure ES-4). This includes, by payer:
–New York State.  Increased spending of
$5.5 billion, mostly for subsidies in the
Exchange;  
–Federal government.  Increased spending
of $1.2 billion in matching payments for
currently eligible public program enrollees;
–Families.  Increased spending of $600
million because of premium requirements
in the Exchange; and
–Employers. Savings of $3.2 billion
because some employers currently 
Figure ES-2. Net Change in Spending by Payer* (billions)
Note: Costs for Pay-or-Play, Pay-or-Play with Individual Mandate, Individual Mandate, and Modest Employer Assessment with Individual Mandate 
scenarios also include costs for combined public reforms (administrative simplification, expansion of FHP to 150% FPL, and FHP buy-in).
* Reflects change over current spending on health insurance.
offering coverage would drop it with the
availability of subsidized coverage in the
Exchange.  
- Currently insuring employers would
save $3.6 billion; 
- Currently non-insuring employers
would spend $400 million more than
under current law.  
UNIVERSAL COVERAGE: INDIVIDUAL
MANDATE AND EMPLOYER PAY-OR-PLAY
This universal coverage option is modeled on a
“Creating Consensus” proposal that shares
responsibility among employers, as well as with
federal and state governments and individuals.
In addition to public program expansions for
low-income individuals, it includes both an
individual mandate and an employer pay-or-
play contribution. The employer pay-or-play
policy assessment (8 percent payroll assessment
on firms with more than 10 workers) is 
comparable to the typical contribution toward
an individual premium by employers that
finance health benefits for employees. It would
encourage a greater number of employers to
continue to offer coverage directly than the
more modest assessment, and would provide a
source of financing to support the cost of other
reforms.
The policy would reduce the number of
uninsured by 2.4 million, as would the modest
employer assessment combined with public
program expansion and the individual mandate.
However, it would reduce state outlays from
$5.5 billion under the modest employer 
assessment to $4 billion under the employer
pay-or-play option. Employers would save $600
million overall relative to the current system of
financing.  Currently insuring employers’ costs
would decrease by $1.7 billion because some
would drop coverage and pay the assessment as
a result of low-wage worker subsidies, while
employers that do not currently finance 
coverage would see an increase in spending of
$1.1 billion on newly offered coverage or
assessments. Families would save $300 million
compared with current law.
A key issue in making universal coverage
viii United Hospital Fund
Employer- 
Sponsored
9.7 m
Directly Purchased
0.5 m
Medicaid/
FHP/CHP
3.6 m
19.1 million people
Current Distribution Post-Reform
Medicare and
Other Public
2.5 m
Uninsured
2.8 m
2%
19%
13%
15%
51%
Employer- 
Sponsored
8.7 m
Directly
Purchased
0.3 m
Insurance 
Exchange + 
FHP Buy-In
2.2 m
Medicare and
Other Public
2.5 m
Medicaid/
FHP/CHP
5.0 m
Uninsured
0.4 m
2%
26%
12%
13%
2%
45%
Figure ES-3. Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage, Before and After Reform
(Public Expansion, Insurance Exchange, Individual Mandate, and Modest Employer Assessment)
Note:“Post-Reform” scenario includes administrative simplification, expansion of FHP to 150% FPL, subsidized buy-in to FHP (150%-300% FPL), individual
mandate, and modest employer assessment. “Medicare and Other Public” category includes dual eligibles and persons covered by CHAMPUS.
Data include persons of all ages. Numbers may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
work is whether or not New York has sufficient
money to finance it.  Financing options include
redirecting uncompensated care subsidy funds
(an estimated $1.3 billion in state and local
payments), tapping employers for contributions,
seeking federal financial participation for the
FHP expansion and buy-in, and raising the
residual funds required. 
Ultimately, universal coverage would 
eliminate the most significant source of
inequity and inefficiency from the health care
system and would provide a foundation for
making large-scale improvements.  Coverage
would allow formerly uninsured persons to
access services more easily and receive timely
and appropriate care.  Providers would be
reimbursed directly rather than through 
indirect subsidies, and linking payments to
people would allow for a greater level of
accountability in the system.  Further, 
significant enrollment in the Exchange could
make it a vehicle for driving cost control and
quality reforms.  Once all persons are covered,
the state can approach system change to
achieve the most comprehensive and effective
solutions to the enduring challenges of the
quality and cost of care.  Universal coverage is
a significant achievement in its own right.  It is
also a fundamental step toward realizing a
high-performance health care system.
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This report presents the Blueprint for Coverage
in New York, a project undertaken by the
United Hospital Fund and The Commonwealth
Fund to explore a set of strategies to achieve
universal health insurance coverage in New
York.1 Taking into consideration the 
characteristics of New York’s uninsured, as well
as problems with existing public and private
coverage, we developed specifications for a
series of detailed coverage expansion options
that would not only expand coverage for the
uninsured but also establish a more secure
foundation of coverage for all New Yorkers.
We explored a series of voluntary public 
program reforms, premium subsidies to make
coverage more affordable, a new group 
insurance purchasing mechanism, and employer
and individual mandates to reach these goals.
While these changes could be made individually,
when implemented together they would
achieve universal coverage and improve other
coverage options for the insured to provide a
more cohesive and stable health insurance 
system for New York.  
In this report, we present the findings of
simulation modeling of these expansion 
scenarios conducted by The Lewin Group
using its Health Benefits Simulation Model
(HBSM).2 We report the estimated costs and
coverage impacts of a range of policies to
expand health insurance coverage in New York. 
Health Insurance Coverage
in New York:
The Current Picture  
More than 9.7 million New Yorkers of all ages,
or just over half of the state’s population, are
covered by employer-sponsored insurance,
while only two percent of New York State 
residents purchase coverage directly through
the non-group market.  One-fifth of New
Yorkers, or 3.6 million people, are covered by a
public health insurance program such as
Medicaid, Family Health Plus (FHP), or Child
Health Plus (CHP).3 For non-disabled adults
and children, most of this publicly sponsored
coverage is provided by private plans contracting
with New York’s public programs.  Another 13
percent of the state’s residents are covered by
Medicare or other public coverage, such as
CHAMPUS.  Finally, about 2.8 million 
residents of all ages are uninsured, representing
15 percent of the State’s total population (see
Figure 1).4
Coverage within these categories is not
static, however—people move in and out of
different categories as well as lose and gain
insurance.  Even for individuals and families
who have health insurance, coverage is often
unstable, uncertain, or increasingly 
unaffordable.  In the employer-sponsored
insurance market, premiums have been rising,
forcing many employers to require higher 
premium contributions and cost-sharing from
their workers.  As coverage becomes less
affordable, employer-sponsored coverage has
been gradually eroding.5 Premiums in the
non-group or direct-pay market are largely 
unaffordable for low-to-moderate-income New
Yorkers, and have also been rising in recent
years.6 In addition, the problem of churning
among public program beneficiaries—cycling
on and off coverage despite continued 
eligibility—is well documented.7 Together, the
coverage expansion approaches presented in
the Blueprint for Coverage would help to
address these issues and stabilize coverage for
all New Yorkers.       
New York’s policymakers have taken a
bipartisan approach to expanding health 
insurance coverage, drawing on strategies that
include public health insurance expansions for
children through Child Health Plus and for
A Blueprint for Universal Coverage          
Introduction
Part I. Background and Strategies
parents and childless adults through the Family
Health Plus program; simplification of public
program enrollment and renewal processes;
and the introduction of the Healthy New York
program, which targets low-income workers
and small employers.  Despite the gains 
realized through these efforts, the number of
uninsured in New York remains high, with 
serious consequences for the uninsured, their
families, and the State’s entire health care 
system.
Of New York’s estimated 2.8 million 
uninsured, more than two-fifths (41 percent)
are already eligible for an existing public health
insurance program. Another 36 percent have
low-to-moderate incomes (below 300 percent
of the federal poverty level [FPL]) but are 
ineligible for public coverage, and the remaining
23 percent have incomes above 300 percent
FPL (see Figure 2).8 Based on these 
characteristics of New York’s uninsured 
population, the Blueprint for Coverage includes
approaches designed to increase public 
program participation among those who are
currently eligible and to increase the 
affordability of health insurance coverage for
low-to-moderate-income uninsured New
Yorkers.9
Importance of Health
Insurance Coverage
Understanding the magnitude of the 
problem of the uninsured, comprehending the
risks facing those currently insured if they have 
inadequate coverage or lose coverage, and 
finding solutions to these problems is vital to
ensuring the health and well-being of New
York’s residents, families, and communities, as
well as its health care system and economy.
Research from a range of sources demonstrates
that the lack of health insurance coverage 
seriously affects the health of the uninsured and
their families.  In its comprehensive series of
reports on the consequences of uninsurance,
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) documents
that the uninsured are less than half as likely as
persons with insurance to receive necessary
care; they are also less likely to receive 
appropriate care for chronic conditions or to
receive preventive care in general.  Health 
outcomes for the uninsured are consequently
compromised by the lack of insurance, as 
diagnoses may be delayed and chronic 
conditions that are not properly managed may
result in more severe or even disabling 
conditions.  Uninsured persons who are hospi-
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Figure 1. Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage in New York State, 2006
talized receive fewer services when admitted
and are more likely to die in the hospital than
those who are insured.  Ultimately, being 
uninsured contributes to an increased risk of
mortality.10
The negative effects of uninsurance extend
beyond the uninsured and their families to 
communities and the entire health care 
system.  As the IOM describes, a high 
uninsured rate places a significant burden on
health care providers and institutions and 
ultimately affects everyone who accesses the
health care system, whether insured or not.
Multiple studies have demonstrated that low-to-
moderate-income insured residents in 
communities with high uninsured rates have
greater difficulty in accessing health care than
those in communities with lower uninsured
rates.  Ultimately, a high uninsured rate can
reduce health care access for all community
members.  The financial burden of caring for a
large uninsured population strains the health
care system and can threaten its ability to 
provide high-quality health care to all community
members.11
The large number of uninsured residents in
New York may also have significant economic
consequences for all New York residents. The
costs of paying for care for the uninsured are
ultimately passed down to all taxpayers and
health care consumers.  Government may raise
taxes or divert funding for other needed services
in order to obtain the revenue necessary to
reimburse providers for uncompensated care.
Prices for health care services, and consequently
health insurance, increase in order to 
compensate for providing care to the uninsured.
Additionally, the health consequences of being
uninsured can ultimately lead to poor health
and disability, which in turn may result in loss of
income and dependence on public support.12
The IOM estimates that, at the national
level, societal costs due to uninsurance are
between $65 billion and $130 billion per year.
These costs are driven primarily by poor health
and increased mortality among the uninsured,
but also by Medicare and disability support 
payments, demands on the public health system,
and reduced health care service capacity.13
Overall, the IOM findings demonstrate that 
covering the uninsured is essential for improving
the health of uninsured individuals and families,
but it is also a necessary step toward stabilizing
and improving the entire health care system.
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Figure 2. Total Uninsured in New York, by Eligibility for Public Health Insurance
Coverage and Income
Principles for Reform
We identified a series of principles to guide the
design and assessment of potential policy
options for expanding health insurance coverage
in New York.  These principles include the 
following:      
• Affordability. Increase affordability of
health insurance premiums while maintaining
comprehensive benefits, so that low-income
individuals and working families are able to
obtain coverage that provides access to care
with financial protection.
• Administrative simplicity. Reduce 
administrative complexity to make it simpler
to obtain and retain public and private health
insurance coverage.
• Stability of coverage. Reduce churning in
public health insurance programs and
increase overall stability of coverage.  
• Shared responsibility. Share responsibility
for the cost of coverage among individuals,
employers, and federal and state government.
• Continuity with existing programs. Build
on existing programs in New York.
• Choice. Provide several coverage options.  
• Pool risk. Reduce non-group and small-
group purchase of coverage in favor of pooled
options to spread risk and increase bargaining
clout through a large risk pool.
• Efficiency and quality. Provide a 
foundation for increasing efficiency and 
quality of New York State’s entire health care
system to benefit all New Yorkers, insured
and previously uninsured.  Covering the 
uninsured is a critical step toward 
accomplishing these goals.
Strategies for Expansion
We selected potential coverage expansion
strategies for modeling in the Blueprint for
Coverage based on these principles for reform
as well as the characteristics of New York’s
uninsured population and problems with 
current sources of group coverage, as described
above.    
PUBLIC PROGRAM SIMPLIFICATION The
first strategy advanced in the Blueprint focuses
on expanding coverage for the 1.2 million 
uninsured New Yorkers who are already eligible
for public health insurance programs.
Specifically, we sought to achieve this through
simplification of the enrollment and 
recertification processes for public health
insurance programs to make it easier for 
persons who are eligible to enroll and retain
public coverage; this would also align with the
goal of reducing churning in public health
insurance programs.  In recent years, New York
State implemented a range of policies to 
simplify and streamline public program 
enrollment and renewal.14 For the Blueprint,
we selected four new simplification strategies
that build on prior reforms and have the 
greatest promise for further increasing 
participation in New York’s public health 
insurance programs (see “Voluntary Public
Program Changes Modeled”).  
In selecting these strategies, we considered
which simplification measures have had the
greatest impact on enrollment in other states,
how states have balanced simplification reforms
with program integrity, and whether changes
would be eligible for federal matching 
payments. Another important consideration in
public program simplification is the trade-off
between limiting “crowd-out” of employer-
sponsored insurance (ESI) and promoting equity
among New Yorkers purchasing coverage.  The
concern about equity is particularly relevant as
we move beyond voluntary strategies to 
mandatory coverage scenarios, as discussed
later in this report.  Finally, while we did not
specifically model such a provision, the 
implementation of an electronic application 
system would make the public health insurance
enrollment processes more efficient and 
effective.
AFFORDABILITY OF COVERAGE  A second
Blueprint strategy is to increase the affordability
of coverage for uninsured New Yorkers who are
not currently eligible for public coverage but
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have low to moderate incomes.  The public
program changes, as well as the mandatory
coverage expansion strategies discussed in later
sections, take into consideration the need to
make coverage more affordable for those with
limited incomes.  To achieve this, we designed
two new features: an expansion of FHP 
eligibility for childless adults and a buy-in to
FHP with premium subsidies for New Yorkers
with low to moderate incomes (below 300 
percent FPL).  In developing the buy-in strategy,
we considered a number of design options.
We selected FHP as the buy-in program
because it is an existing program with a 
comprehensive benefits package.15 For purposes
of equity, this subsidized buy-in option would
be uniformly available to persons at the same
income level, regardless of prior coverage 
status.  We chose to model this as an individual
buy-in rather than an employer buy-in because
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VOLUNTARY PUBLIC PROGRAM CHANGES MODELED
Simplification of public program application and renewal procedures
• Self-declaration of income.  Allow individuals to self-attest to income instead of submitting
documents to prove income levels.
• Express lane eligibility.  Notify Food Stamp recipients who appear to be eligible of potential
eligibility for Medicaid/Child Health Plus; share data with Medicaid/Child Health Plus to
avoid duplicating information and documentation. 
• Administrative renewal.  Conduct detailed renewal process every other year, with postcard
renewal in interim years.
• Asset test.  Remove the asset test as an eligibility requirement for Medicaid and Family
Health Plus.
Expansion of Family Health Plus eligibility
• Expand FHP eligibility to 150 percent FPL for childless adults, aligning their eligibility with
that of parents.  
Subsidized buy-in to FHP 
• Allow people with income between 150 percent and 300 percent FPL to buy in to FHP with
income-related sliding-scale premium assistance. 
• Coverage is purchased through the Insurance Exchange.
• Sliding-Scale Subsidy Schedule:
<150% FPL 100% subsidy
150%-200% FPL 80% subsidy
201%-250% FPL 65% subsidy
251%-275% FPL 50% subsidy
276%-300% FPL 25% subsidy
>300% FPL 0% subsidy
• No waiting period required. 
These three voluntary public program changes are the building blocks for further reform.  All
mandatory policy changes described later are modeled with these building blocks in place.  (See
Appendix B for a discussion of The Lewin Group’s modeling assumptions.)
subsidies can be more efficiently targeted to
individuals than to employers, despite the fact
that an employer buy-in could help retain
employer contributions.   An alternative 
formulation would allow employers to buy in to
FHP or to support employee purchase of 
coverage through the buy-in.    
PURCHASING MECHANISM The buy-in
design also compels a third core Blueprint
strategy:  the creation of a purchasing 
mechanism that would provide individuals with
a choice of coverage options at group rates.
This entity, called an Insurance Exchange (the
Exchange), provides a foundation for New York
to offer coordinated options and plan choices
to individuals and small groups.  It also could
be expanded beyond FHP plans to Healthy
New York, and other plans meeting minimum
standards that insurers choose to offer through
the Exchange.  
The Exchange also provides a vehicle to
offer more affordable coverage.  All enrollees in
the Exchange would be charged a “pooled”
group rate, and two forms of income-related
subsidies would be available for FHP: 
• Sliding-scale premium subsidy for those with
income below 300 percent FPL;
• Premium contribution cap16 of:  
– No more than 8 percent of income for 
persons with income below 400 percent
FPL;
– No more than 10 percent of income for
persons with income above 400 percent
FPL.
The FHP buy-in (and the employer pay-or-play
provisions described below) would significantly
increase enrollment into the Exchange.
Because of the complexity of the associated
administrative responsibilities and questions
about the capacity of existing plan networks,
the Exchange would administer the FHP buy-
in program.  The Exchange would be 
responsible for a range of administrative 
functions, including enrollment, eligibility
determination for subsidies, collection of 
premium payments through payroll deductions,
and administration of the premium subsidies
through the tax system.
The Exchange is envisioned as a way to
bring low-income uninsured persons into group
coverage, offer a choice of plans for employees
working for small employers, and address 
problems for moderate-income persons by
making affordable and stable coverage available
to all.  Because of this design, including the
premium assistance, the Exchange should
attract enrollment while limiting adverse 
selection (the disproportionate enrollment of
persons with high risk of poor health). 
Further, because people of all incomes could
buy in to coverage through the Exchange, this
would allow for seamless transitions as workers
change jobs or if eligibility for subsidies should
change.  We envision that insurers would offer
additional coverage options here and that the
Exchange would increasingly be seen as a
source of reliable coverage for small groups and
individuals.  Ultimately, employers—in 
addition to individuals—would be permitted to
purchase coverage through the Exchange.  As
the number of enrollees grows, the Exchange
would have the potential to realize significant
administrative efficiencies and be a vehicle for
improving quality, containing costs, and
improving value.  
COVERAGE MANDATES  The initial public 
expansion would result in a substantial
decrease in the uninsured yet still leave two
million uninsured New Yorkers.  To achieve
universal coverage, additional expansion 
strategies would have to be employed.  We
also, therefore, considered coverage man-
dates—on employers and on individuals—as
our fourth and fifth Blueprint strategies.
One option we considered is an employer
pay-or-play approach, whereby employers with
10 or more employees would contribute 8 
percent of payroll or receive a credit toward
this assessment for coverage offered.  This
approach was designed to meet the constraints
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imposed by the Employee Retirement and
Income Security Act (ERISA).17 We also 
examined how a smaller assessment, similar to
that recently enacted in Massachusetts, would
affect coverage expansion and financing.  This
“modest” assessment is designed to cover the
bad debts of uninsured workers and dependents.
Because these provisions would be implemented
after the public program changes described
above, workers whose employers chose to pay
an assessment instead of directly providing ESI
would have additional affordable coverage
options available to them through the
Exchange.  Furthermore, additional subsidies
would be available once the mandates are
introduced.  Premium contributions would be
capped at 8 percent or 10 percent of income
for coverage purchased through the Exchange,
a provision that would help to make coverage
more affordable for persons at all income levels
(see “Mandatory Policy Changes Modeled,”
page 14, for more detail on the premium 
contribution caps). 
We explored an individual mandate as a
second variant of mandated coverage because
the modeling indicated that such a requirement
would be necessary to achieve universal 
coverage.  We designed the individual mandate
to follow the public expansions and creation of
the Exchange so that provisions to ease access
to public coverage and increase the number of
affordable coverage options would be in place
before imposing a mandate.  The individual
mandate would be implemented with automatic
enrollment through the tax system, whereby
individuals would be automatically enrolled in
the coverage for which they are eligible.
Income-related premium assistance could also
be administered through the tax system.  
If implemented in tandem, the employer
requirement (either pay-or-play or the modest
assessment) would help fund the coverage
expansion while the individual mandate
approach would ultimately achieve universal
coverage in New York.  We envision that the
employer and individual mandates would be
implemented after the Exchange had matured
to the point that a range of coverage options
would be available, including the FHP buy-in,
Healthy New York, and other private plans, as
described above.  
Part II. Modeling
Specifications and Results
Building Blocks for
Coverage: Voluntary Public
Program Changes
In designing the Blueprint for Coverage around
the strategies described above, we used what
we refer to as “building blocks” for 
coverage.  Under the building block approach
to reform, changes would first be made to 
public programs in order to enroll persons who
are currently eligible on a voluntary basis.
Simplification of public program enrollment
and renewal would be implemented to enroll
currently eligible but uninsured persons.  An
expansion of eligibility for coverage would also
be introduced to enroll childless adults whose
income is just above current eligibility levels.
In addition, a subsidized buy-in to FHP would
make affordable coverage available to additional
moderate-income New Yorkers.  In this way,
New York would make subsidized coverage
available to more of the population in order to
begin to address the issue of affordability
before considering mandatory coverage options. 
The goal of these building blocks—what
we refer to, throughout this report, as public
program changes—is to cover as many New
Yorkers as possible on a voluntary basis.  The
Blueprint models these options individually to
determine their independent effects and then
together in a “combined public program” policy
scenario to show what would happen if they
were introduced at the same time.  The com-
bined public program policy changes represent
the foundation upon which mandatory reform
options are designed and modeled.
SIMPLIFICATION OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS
Policy Change. The first public program
building block modeled is a combination of
four policy changes intended to simplify the
application and renewal process in New York’s
public health insurance programs.  These
changes include three simplification strategies
and the removal of an eligibility requirement:
• Self-declaration of income. Individuals
applying to any public health insurance 
program would be allowed to self-attest to
income instead of submitting documents to
prove their income levels.  State Medicaid
agencies would verify self-declared income
using existing databases as well as random
quality control audits.18
• Express lane eligibility. Food Stamp 
recipients and applicants who appear to be
eligible for public health insurance coverage
based on their income would be notified by
an eligibility worker of their potential eligibility
for Medicaid, FHP, or CHP, and be referred
to the appropriate program.  With the 
recipient’s permission, the Food Stamp 
program would also share data with the
appropriate program so that the recipient
would not have to provide duplicate 
information and documentation.19
• Administrative renewal. Medicaid, Family
Health Plus, and Child Health Plus 
recipients would undergo a detailed eligibility
review and recertification process every other
year, with postcard renewal in interim years.
In those administrative renewal years, 
recipients would be mailed a postcard asking
whether their income or other circumstances
had changed.  Recipients would be required
to return their postcards, and those reporting
no changes would be recertified for another
year without further action.20 
• Eliminate the asset test from community
Medicaid and Family Health Plus. This
policy change represents the removal of an
eligibility requirement, rather than a program
simplification.  While there is no asset test
for children in Child Health Plus A
(Medicaid for children) or Child Health Plus
B (SCHIP), there is an asset test in place for
adults applying for Medicaid or Family
Health Plus.21 This policy change would
eliminate the asset limit for non-elderly, non-
disabled adults.  
Findings. The combined simplification 
measures would enroll approximately 310,000
uninsured New Yorkers into a public health
insurance program.  In total, 480,000 adults
and children would enroll in a public health
insurance program—two-thirds of them having
been uninsured and one-third having left
employer-sponsored or non-group coverage.
The total government cost of these 
simplification reforms would be $810 million.22
This cost would be shared by the state and 
federal government, with the state responsible
for approximately $390 million and the federal
government for $420 million in federal matching
funds.  These figures include the costs for 
covering the new enrollees under the new 
policies, net of approximately $60 million in
administrative savings that would result from
the reduced paperwork and decreased 
administrative burden for the state (Table 1).   
The results presented here are for the
combined simplification policies.  For the
impact and costs of each of the individual 
simplification measures, see the detailed
Lewin Group report.
New Public Coverage Enrollment
310,000 uninsured 
120,000 with employer-sponsored coverage
50,000 with non-group coverage
480,000 newly enrolled in public coverage
The modeling of these public program 
simplifications was based on evidence from
other states that have implemented similar
reforms.  This evidence is limited because
states often introduce multiple simplification
reforms simultaneously or in combination with
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Table 1. Public-Sector Costs (and Savings) of the Public Program Simplification
Reforms (millions)
Costs for Administrative Total Net Federal State
New Costs Costs Share Share
Enrollees
Total $870 ($60) $810 $420 $390
other public program changes, making it 
difficult to distinguish the effect of an individ-
ual reform.  These estimates are likely to be
conservative and the actual coverage effects of
simplification could be greater.
EXPANSION OF FAMILY HEALTH PLUS
ELIGIBILITY
Policy Change. The second public program
building block modeled is an eligibility 
expansion of the FHP program to cover 
childless adults with family incomes up to 150
percent FPL.  Currently, the FHP income 
eligibility level for childless adults is 100 percent
FPL, while parents are eligible with incomes
of up to 150 percent FPL.  Therefore, the
expansion would align eligibility for childless
adults with that of parents.  (See Appendix A
for further information about public program
eligibility.)    
Findings. Raising the FHP eligibility level for
childless adults would cover 210,000 unin-
sured New Yorkers.  In total, 320,000 New
Yorkers would enroll in FHP due to this eligi-
bility expansion, but approximately one-third of
the new enrollees (110,000) would be persons
who had private coverage. 
Two-thirds of the new FHP enrollees
would be childless adults who become newly
eligible due to the eligibility expansion, while
the remaining one-third were eligible but
unenrolled in FHP and would now enroll due
to increased awareness of the program (Table 2).   
The cost to government for this FHP 
expansion would be approximately $1 billion.
In the modeling, it is assumed that federal
matching funds would only be available for
persons who are currently eligible, not for
those whose coverage would require a federal
waiver.  The state would therefore be 
responsible for approximately $860 million and
the federal government for approximately $160
million in matching funds (Table 3).    
SUBSIDIZED BUY-IN TO FAMILY HEALTH
PLUS
Policy Change. The third public program
building block modeled is a subsidized buy-in
to FHP.  In this policy scenario, individuals
and families with incomes between 150 
percent and 300 percent FPL could buy in to
FHP with sliding-scale premium assistance
based on family income.  Persons with income
above 300 percent FPL could purchase FHP
at full premium.  Benefits and co-payments for
Table 2. New Family Health Plus Coverage Due to Expansion
Total Previously Previously Previously
Uninsured with ESI with Non-group
Newly Eligible Adults 210,000 110,000 70,000 20,000
Currently Eligible Adults 110,000 100,000 10,000 10,000
Total 320,000 210,000 80,000 30,000
Note: Numbers do not sum to totals due to rounding.
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those buying in to FHP would be the same as
for those participating in the fully subsidized
FHP program.  To promote equity, no waiting
period would be imposed for those with 
existing health insurance coverage.    
The sliding-scale premium subsidy schedule
would be:
Income as Percent of FPL Subsidy
<150% FPL 100% 
150%-200% FPL 80% 
201%-250% FPL 65%
251%-275% FPL 50%
276%-300% FPL 25% 
>300% FPL 0%
Based on this sliding scale it is estimated that:
• A parent in a household of two with income
of $20,000 would contribute approximately
$600 per year toward coverage, or $50 per
month.   
• A childless adult in a household of two with
income at $34,000 per year would pay
$2,100 per year, or $175 per month.  
• A two-parent, two-child family of four with
income of $51,000 would spend about
$4,800 per year, or $400 per month.  
(See Appendix A for additional estimates of
individual and family premium contributions
by income level.)  
Findings. In total, 1.4 million New Yorkers
with incomes between 150 percent and 300
percent FPL would enter the subsidized FHP
buy-in.  The net reduction in the number of
uninsured under this scenario would be
340,000.23 The reduction in the uninsured
includes people who had been uninsured and
who enrolled in the buy-in, net of a small
number of people who would become unin-
sured because their employers discontinued
coverage with the availability of subsidized
coverage through the buy-in, as described
below.  Nearly three-quarters (71 percent) of
the new buy-in enrollment would be people
who had private coverage, either employer-
sponsored or non-group coverage.
As shown in these findings, the availability
of subsidized coverage with neither an 
assessment on employers for dropping coverage
nor a waiting period for individuals with 
existing coverage leads to a significant shift
away from employer-sponsored insurance and
into the FHP buy-in.  It is assumed that 
individuals drop ESI and enroll in the buy-in if
it is cost-effective to do so, and that employers
stop offering coverage if their workers, on 
average, would pay less in the FHP buy-in
than under ESI (see Appendix B for modeling
assumptions).  However, not all workers whose
employers drop coverage enroll in the buy-in;
some would be eligible for and enroll in fully
subsidized public coverage, while a small 
number would become uninsured. 
The total cost of the subsidized FHP buy-
in is $5.1 billion, including approximately $4.0
billion in state subsidies and nearly $1.2 billion
in premium payments from families (Table 4).
Again, these estimates assume that no federal
matching funds are available to fund the buy-
in.  Potential financing options, including 
federal financial participation for the buy-in,
are discussed later.
Table 3. New Public-Sector Costs of the Family Health Plus Expansion (millions)
Costs for New Federal Share State Share
Enrollees
Newly Eligible Adults $720 – $720
Currently Eligible Adults $300 $160 $150
(Spillover Effect)
Total $1,020 $160 $860
Note: Numbers do not sum to totals due to rounding.
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COMBINED PUBLIC PROGRAM CHANGES
All of the public program changes would be
implemented before introducing mandatory
coverage policies.  This approach aims to cover
as many New Yorkers as possible on a voluntary
basis by enrolling the eligible but uninsured
through simplification, raising FHP eligibility
levels for childless adults, and increasing the
affordability of coverage for moderate-income
New Yorkers through the FHP buy-in.  Since
there would be some overlap between the 
populations targeted by these policies, we
modeled a scenario in which these changes are
made simultaneously.  This “combined public
program” scenario reduces the number of
uninsured New Yorkers by 840,000, a nearly
one-third reduction in New York’s uninsured
population, with approximately half of those
840,000 formerly uninsured enrolling in the
FHP buy-in through the Exchange and half
enrolling in public coverage (see Figure 3).
These changes result in large enrollment
increases in public programs and the FHP
buy-in through the Exchange.  A total of
950,000 people enroll in Medicaid, FHP, or
CHP.  Another 1.5 million people enroll in the
FHP buy-in through the Exchange, including
1.2 million with incomes between 150 percent
and 300 percent FPL and 350,000 people with
income above 300 percent FPL who buy in at
full premium.  In total, nearly 2.5 million 
people enroll in public coverage and the FHP
buy-in as a result of these policy changes.
Approximately one-third of this new public
program enrollment is made up of people who
were uninsured, while two-thirds of the
enrollees lost or left private coverage (see
Figures 3 and 4). 
The net cost of implementing the combined
public program changes is $1.7 billion.  The
Table 4. Public-Sector and Family Costs of the Subsidized FHP Buy-In (millions)
Total Costs State Subsidies Family Premium Payments
$5,120 $3,970 $1,150
Figure 3. Coverage Shifts: Public Program Changes Combined (millions)
Note: Coverage shifts are for combined public reforms (administrative simplification, expansion of FHP to 150% FPL, and buy-in to FHP).
Numbers presented in this chart may not sum to totals and may not match numbers in the text due to rounding.
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Figure 4. Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage, Before and After 
Combined Public Program Changes
Note: “Post-Reform” scenario includes the combined administrative simplification, expansion of FHP to 150% FPL, and subsidized buy-in to 
FHP (150%-300% FPL). “Medicare and Other Public” category includes dual eligibles and persons covered by CHAMPUS.
Data include persons of all ages. Numbers may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
incremental cost to the state would be $4.8 bil-
lion, which includes spending for new public
program enrollees and FHP premium 
subsidies, as well as program administration.
The federal government would be responsible
for increased spending of $800 million in
matching funds, while families would bear
$500 million in new premium costs.  Family
contributions would be higher overall under
this combined policy scenario due to the fact
that there are more newly insured persons who
face partial or full premiums in the FHP 
buy-in.  However, employers would experience
significant savings under this scenario due to
the large shifts away from ESI and into public
coverage.24 In total, employers would save
$4.4 billion with the combined public program
changes (see Figure 5).  Presumably, most of
these savings would accrue to employers with
low-wage workforces.  
The large shifts in coverage and costs from
employers to government-funded programs
observed in the combined public program 
scenario suggest the need to consider policies
to reduce these effects or to assure that financ-
ing follows the flow of people.  If the public
program changes were implemented without
any mandatory coverage policies, decision 
makers might consider introducing a waiting
period in the FHP buy-in for individuals with
ESI.  We did not model such a waiting period
because the balance of the Blueprint explores
policies that would mandate coverage and are
intended to be implemented in combination
with the voluntary public program changes.
Under the mandatory employer scenarios,
assessments on employers would reduce the
loss of ESI and provide a source of financing.
Further, if individuals are required to purchase
coverage, then to promote equity they must be
able take advantage of the coverage that is
most affordable and best suited to their 
coverage needs.    
Achieving Universal
Coverage  
Mandates are necessary to achieve universal
coverage in New York. The voluntary public
program changes would achieve a nearly 
one-third reduction in the uninsured, but still
leave two million uninsured New Yorkers.
A Blueprint for Universal Coverage        13
State$4.8
$0.8
-$4.4
$0.5
Federal
Employer
Family
Total net cost = $1.7 b
bi
lli
on
s
-$4
-$2
0
$2
$4
$6
-$6
Figure 5. Net Change in Spending by Payer, Combined Public Program 
Changes* (billions)
Note: Net costs for each stakeholder are for combined public reforms (administrative simplification, expansion of FHP to 150% FPL, and buy-in to FHP).
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Therefore, we examined a range of mandatory
coverage scenarios, including requirements for
employers to offer coverage, contribute 
financially toward the cost of coverage, or both,
as well as mandates on individuals to purchase
coverage. 
As described above, voluntary public 
program changes—simplification reforms, 
eligibility expansions, and newly subsidized
FHP coverage—result in a large shift of people
from employer and non-group coverage into
publicly sponsored coverage and coverage 
purchased through the Exchange.  As modeled,
people select the source of coverage that best
meets their needs without a penalty for 
switching between coverage sources.
Provisions that either mitigate this shift and/or
help to finance the new coverage options are
put into place under the following “mandatory”
coverage scenarios.  These include a range of
assessments on employers not offering 
coverage (non-offering employers) that either
induce more employers to offer coverage
directly or raise revenues to pay for coverage
obtained through the Exchange, as well as a
mandate on individuals that compels 
enrollment into available coverage and results
in increased demand for ESI.  In the scenarios
that include an employer requirement, 
employers ultimately finance a significant 
portion of enrollment through the Exchange, so
we do not describe this shift from ESI to the
Exchange as a loss of employer coverage but
rather as providing a new coverage option that
is at least partially funded by employers. 
When selecting the mandatory scenarios to
model, we considered lessons from other
states.  In recent years, state efforts to expand
health insurance coverage have focused on
models that would increase employer 
responsibility for coverage.25 These efforts
have been unsuccessful for a number of 
reasons: these initiatives have been met with
significant resistance from the business 
community, and research in at least one state
concluded that the program’s design would
have limited impact on coverage rates.26 More
recently, states have begun to explore the idea
of mandates on individuals to directly purchase
or take up health insurance coverage offered.27
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MANDATORY POLICY CHANGES MODELED
Employer Requirement
Two scenarios, employer pay-or-play and a modest employer assessment, were modeled as 
alternative approaches to an employer requirement.
Employer pay-or-play
• Employers with 10 or more workers are assessed an 8 percent payroll contribution. A credit is
given to employers that provide health insurance coverage and contribute at least 60 percent
of the premium. 
• Employees can purchase subsidized FHP coverage through the Insurance Exchange.
Available coverage in the Exchange includes Family Health Plus, Healthy New York, and other
plans insurers decide to offer through the Exchange.  
• Family premiums for FHP coverage purchased in the Exchange are subsidized in two ways: 
1) income-related sliding-scale premium subsidies for those with income below 300 percent
FPL, and 2) a cap on total premium contributions of 8 percent of income for persons with
income below 400 percent FPL and 10 percent of income for persons with income above 400
percent FPL.
Modest employer assessment
• Employers with 10 or more workers that do not provide health insurance coverage and con-
tribute at least 60 percent of the premium will be required to pay a modest annual assessment
of $400 per worker to the state.
• Insurance Exchange and subsidy provisions described earlier are also in place.
Individual Mandate  
This scenario was modeled alone and in combination with pay-or-play or the modest employer
assessment.
• Everyone in New York State is required to purchase health insurance coverage. 
• Individuals who do not enroll in coverage voluntarily are auto-enrolled into coverage for which
they are eligible and charged the premium owed. 
• The subsidy structure is the same as under the employer pay-or-play scenario described
above. 
• The mandate is enforced through the tax system. The modeling assumes that all people in
families with tax filers will take coverage through their employer, Medicaid/FHP, or the
Insurance Exchange.
All of these policy scenarios are modeled in combination with the voluntary building block
changes described earlier.  The modeling results indicate that the three scenarios that include
an individual mandate would achieve universal coverage.  
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Research pertaining to health care reform
efforts in Massachusetts in particular 
demonstrated that an individual mandate
would be necessary—either alone or in 
conjunction with an employer requirement—in
order to reach universal coverage.28 This past
April, Massachusetts enacted the
Massachusetts Health Reform Act of 2006,
which includes a public program expansion,
employer responsibility provisions, and an 
individual mandate.29 This combination of
reforms represents one model for achieving
universal coverage on a state level and is
attractive because, importantly, it reflects a
critical compromise reached among stakeholders
in the business, government, provider, and
advocacy communities that has not been
achieved elsewhere.  
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE WITHOUT
EMPLOYER REQUIREMENT An individual
mandate would have a significant impact on
coverage rates.  When implemented in combi-
nation with the voluntary public program
changes, an individual mandate would cover 2.4
million of the 2.8 million uninsured New
Yorkers.  These coverage gains occur through
increased take-up of employer-sponsored 
insurance and public coverage, as well as 
significant enrollment through the Exchange.
An individual mandate increases employee
demand for ESI and thereby induces more
employers to offer coverage, and some workers
who previously declined an employer coverage
offer would now participate.  Further, as
designed here, all of those eligible for public
coverage would be automatically enrolled into
the appropriate public program.
Because there would be no assessment on
non-offering employers in this scenario, the
distribution of spending under the individual
mandate scenario is skewed toward the state.
The overall net cost of this policy scenario is
$4.2 billion.  Employers would save $4.1 
billion, while the state government would be
responsible for $6.2 billion, the federal 
government would spend $1.2 billion, and 
families would spend $900 million more than
under current law.  These net costs are very
similar to those under the modest employer
assessment scenario (described below) because
the effect of having no employer penalty is
similar to that of a small penalty.  The 
incremental differences in net costs to the
state and employers between these two 
scenarios are a result of the assessment, which
induces a small number of employers to offer
ESI directly. 
APPLYING THE MASSACHUSETTS MODEL
TO NEW YORK We modeled a policy scenario
for New York that closely resembles the
Massachusetts health care reform act: voluntary
public program changes in combination with a
modest assessment on employers and an 
individual mandate (see “Comparing New York
and Massachusetts,” page 22). Our modeling
results indicate that this combination of policy
reforms would reach 2.4 million of the 2.8 
million uninsured New Yorkers, achieving a 98
percent coverage rate (see Figures 6 and 7).
As described above, the voluntary public 
program changes would result in a shift of 
people from employer and non-group coverage
into the public programs and the Exchange.
The addition of an individual mandate in this 
scenario would compel a significant increase in
take-up of available coverage, driving the
reduction in the number of uninsured.
Because the assessment on employers who do
not offer coverage is small under this scenario,
it would not provide an incentive for many
employers to newly offer coverage. As a result,
there would be no direct impact on coverage
rates from the assessment itself.  The employer
assessment would, however, raise $400 million
in revenues that would be used to offset the
state’s cost of the coverage expansions.  (The
390,000 people who would remain uninsured
are non-tax filers who cannot be enrolled
through the tax system.)        
The overall net cost of this reform proposal
is $4.1 billion. New York State would contribute
$5.5 billion in new spending, mostly toward
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subsidies for coverage purchased through the
Exchange.  The federal government would 
contribute $1.2 billion in Medicaid, FHP, and
Child Health Plus matching payments for 
currently eligible public program enrollees.
Families would spend $600 million more than
under current law because of premium
requirements in the Exchange. Despite the
modest assessment, employers would save $3.2
billion because many currently offering
employers would drop coverage as a result of
the availability of subsidized coverage in the
Exchange.  Currently insuring employers
(those who offer and whose employees take up
ESI) would save $3.6 billion and currently
non-insuring employers would spend $400 
million more than they would under current
law (see Figure 8).    
EMPLOYER PAY-OR-PLAY WITH AND 
WITHOUT AN INDIVIDUAL MANDATE  We
also modeled an employer pay-or-play scenario
in which non-offering employers would con-
tribute 8 percent of payroll, an amount that
approximates the typical contribution toward
an individual premium by employers that now
finance health benefits for employees.30 This
option builds on a “Creating Consensus” 
proposal that shares responsibility among
employers, as well as with federal and state
governments and individuals.31 The pay-or-play
policy itself (without an individual mandate)
has a modest impact on the uninsured: only an
additional 130,000 previously uninsured New
Yorkers would gain coverage under this 
scenario.  This is because most employees who
would gain ESI as a result of this policy would
shift from another source of coverage.  An
advantage of this approach is that it raises $1
billion in employer assessment revenue to help
offset the cost of other reforms.  The pay-or-
play approach also results in a greater number
of employers continuing to offer coverage
directly than with a more modest assessment.  
When an employer pay-or-play requirement
is implemented in combination with an 
individual mandate and the aforementioned
public program changes, 2.4 million previously
uninsured New Yorkers are covered.
Importantly, because employers are assessed
more than in the modest assessment scenario,
more employers provide coverage directly.
Therefore, these coverage gains are achieved at
a lower cost to both the state and to families
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Figure 8. Net Change in Spending by Payer: Modest Employer Assessment 
with Individual Mandate and All Public Program Changes (billions)
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Figure 9. Incremental Change in Uninsured by Policy (thousands)
compared with the modest employer assessment
scenario.  The net cost of this scenario is $4.1
billion.  The state would be responsible for $4
billion and the federal government for $1 bil-
lion in new spending.  Employers would save
$600 million overall: spending by currently
insuring employers would decrease by $1.7 bil-
lion as some drop coverage and instead pay the
assessment, and currently non-insuring
employers would see an increase in spending
of $1.1 billion on newly offered coverage or
assessments.  Finally, families would save $300
million compared with current law.  Employers
pay more under pay-or-play than under the
modest employer assessment scenario because
more would provide coverage directly; state
government pays less because fewer people
requiring subsidies would be enrolled through
the Exchange; and families pay less because
more would have ESI, where premium require-
ments are lower, than subsidized FHP through
the Exchange. 
Summary of Changes in
Coverage and Spending   
The voluntary public program changes modeled
achieve a nearly one-third reduction in the
uninsured, leaving two million New Yorkers
uninsured (see figure 9).
Despite the fact that nearly half of 
uninsured New Yorkers are eligible for existing
public programs, the implementation of select
simplification reforms was found to achieve
only modest coverage gains.  (As discussed
above, these estimates are limited by the 
available evidence and should be considered to
be conservative.)  The FHP eligibility 
expansion would successfully enroll a number
of newly eligible adults.  In addition, because
of increased awareness due to the expansion,
this policy would encourage a number of
already eligible adults to enroll.  The availability
of subsidized coverage through the FHP buy-in
would result in a shift from employer-sponsored
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coverage into this new coverage option.  In
order to distribute the costs of coverage 
expansions across payers, a range of employer
penalties were modeled: from no employer
requirement under the individual mandate, to
a modest assessment, to an assessment of 8
percent of payroll on non-offering employers.    
Regardless of the specific approach, 
significant subsidies are needed to gain 
participation by low-income persons, as has
been well documented in the research 
literature and in practical experience.32 As
designed here, individuals would pay an
income-related premium contribution toward
FHP.  For example, a parent in a family of two
earning $20,000 would pay 3 percent of
income, while a parent in a family of two earning
$50,000 would pay 6 percent of income.  The
premium caps provide a second source of 
subsidy and are especially important for 
persons at the upper end of the sliding scale
and for families because premiums represent a
greater share of their income.  Without the
premium contribution cap, for example, a family
of four earning $61,000 per year would pay
$9,600 in annual premiums, or 16 percent of
income.  With the premium contribution cap
at 8 percent of income, the same family’s
premium cost would be $4,800 per year. (See
Appendix A for additional estimates of individual
and family premium contributions by income
level.)  The modeling results indicate that the
bulk of the enrollment into the Exchange
would be among persons with income below
300 percent FPL, where subsidies are greatest.
However, while the FHP subsidies drive 
significant costs for the state government, the
premiums may still be unaffordable for some
low-income persons.
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY  Overall net costs
are greater for families under the public pro-
gram changes, the individual mandate, and the 
modest employer assessment scenarios, com-
pared with current law, largely because more
uninsured persons would have coverage.  The
modeling results indicate that under all scenarios
there would be increased utilization of services
among the newly insured, as well as a modest
increase in utilization among the currently
insured because of improved coverage. However,
even once covered, the previously uninsured
would still cost less than those who are 
currently insured because those with greater
health needs are more likely to be already
enrolled in coverage.33 Thus, the cost of 
universal coverage is lower than what might be
expected based on health spending for the 
currently insured.        
Between 1 million and 2.4 million people
would enroll in the FHP buy-in through the
Exchange, depending upon the specific policy
scenario.  The Exchange essentially provides a
new place for people to purchase both 
subsidized and unsubsidized health insurance
coverage and would also serve a variety of
administrative functions, including eligibility
determination for subsidies and premium 
collection.  As the Exchange grows and
includes additional coverage options, it will
increasingly be seen as a more affordable and
stable alternative to small-group and non-group
coverage.  Because of its size, the Exchange
would have the potential to realize significant
administrative efficiencies.  Further, because
coverage in the Exchange would not be tied to
employment and because people of all incomes
could purchase coverage there, people could
remain continuously enrolled regardless of
changes in circumstances.  For these reasons,
the Exchange could help New York realize the
goals of increasing administrative simplicity
and stability of coverage. 
The modeling demonstrated that employer
responsibility provisions have more of an
impact on “who pays” than on directly 
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Figure 10. Coverage Shifts by Policy Scenario (millions)
Note: Coverage shifts for Pay-or-Play, Individual Mandate, Pay-or-Play with Individual Mandate, and Modest Employer Assessment with Individual Mandate
scenarios include coverage shifts for combined public reforms (administrative simplification, expansion of FHP to 150% FPL, and FHP buy-in).
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Note: Costs for Pay-or-Play, Pay-or-Play with Individual Mandate, Individual Mandate, and Modest Employer Assessment with Individual Mandate 
scenarios also include costs for combined public reforms (administrative simplification, expansion of FHP to 150% FPL, and FHP buy-in).
* Reflects change over current spending on health insurance.
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increasing coverage.  For example, an employer
requirement, modeled here as pay-or-play,
results in coverage shifts but insignificant 
coverage gains, but raises significant revenue.
A more modest employer assessment does not
disrupt coverage patterns or result in any 
coverage gains, but raises less revenue to fund
other expansions.  
Ultimately, an individual mandate 
implemented with auto-enrollment is needed
to achieve universal coverage (see Figure 10).  
Ninety-eight percent of New Yorkers would
be covered under each of the three scenarios
modeled that include an individual mandate.
The net cost of each of these scenarios is
roughly $4 billion.  The distribution of this
spending is contingent upon the degree of
employer requirement (see Figure 11).    
FINANCING OPTIONS  There are a range of
potential financing options available to raise
the $4.1 billion to $4.2 billion necessary to
achieve universal coverage in New York.  First,
New York could reallocate spending on the
uninsured from institutional subsidies toward
coverage.  In 2005, New York’s state and local
governments spent $1.3 billion reimbursing
providers for uncompensated care.34 As 
uninsured rates decline, a portion of these
funds could be redirected toward the cost of
providing coverage directly.  The federal 
government also provided $942 million in
Medicaid matching payments for bad debt and
charity care, disproportionate share hospital,
and upper payment limit programs.35 Other
states, such as Massachusetts, have negotiated
such an arrangement with the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services in order to
continue receiving federal matching payments
for this spending.
Second, New York could seek federal
financial participation (FFP) for the FHP
expansion for childless adults and the 
subsidized buy-in to FHP for persons below
300 percent FPL.  Because the modeling 
considered options available to New York 
without a change in federal policy, FFP was
not assumed for either of these expansions.
However, there is precedent for receipt of FFP
for similar programs in other states.36 New
York could receive up to $2.2 billion in federal
matching funds depending upon securing the
necessary federal waiver approval and 
demonstrating Medicaid savings elsewhere in
the program.  Finally, proposed federal tax
credits could potentially offset premium costs
for families.37 All told, there is potential to 
offset a significant portion of the state’s costs
in several ways, but ultimately these coverage 
expansions will require new financing sources.
22 United Hospital Fund          
COMPARING NEW YORK AND MASSACHUSETTS
Given the passage of the Massachusetts Health Reform Act of 2006, many stakeholders have
asked what a similar approach to reaching universal coverage would mean for New York.  When
considering the New York modeling results, it is important to remember several differences
between the two states.  New York has a larger share of low-income people (39 percent vs. 30
percent) and a larger share of uninsured low-income people (62 percent vs. 58 percent); a lower
rate of employer-sponsored insurance (61 percent vs. 68 percent); and a larger “eligible but
uninsured” population (41 percent vs. 23 percent).*  As a result, New York confronts a larger
uninsured population, more of whom would require subsidies, and starts from a lower base of
public and employer coverage than did Massachusetts.   
While our “modest employer assessment with individual mandate and public program changes”
scenario resembles Massachusetts’ health reform, there are some important differences in the
approaches. For example, Massachusetts requires mandatory take-up of available employer 
coverage while the New York scenario modeled would not.  Also, the coverage available through
the Exchange modeled for New York is a comprehensive set of benefits for persons at all income
levels, while higher-income residents in Massachusetts would likely be offered more limited
coverage.  Additionally, premium subsidies would phase out at a higher income level in New
York than in Massachusetts.  
Finally, the Massachusetts individual mandate would be implemented as a coverage 
requirement with penalties for non-enrollment, while the New York scenario envisions automatically
enrolling people into public programs or coverage through the Exchange and charging enrollees
the required premium.  These differences help to explain the relative costs of reaching universal
coverage in the two states.  The New York approach was designed as a starting point for 
discussion and as such is a relatively generous proposal.  Further, because of its estimated size,
the Insurance Exchange could ultimately have significant negotiating power, while this is not
envisioned for the Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector (the entity in Massachusetts that
is similar to the New York Insurance Exchange).
* Data are for 2003 and 2004 and include persons of all ages. “Low income” is defined here as no greater than 200% of the federal poverty level.
The FPL for a family of three was $14,680 in 2003 and $15,067 in 2004. (Urban Institute and Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured
estimates based on the Census Bureau's March 2004 and 2005 Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements. Kaiser State Health
Facts, available online at www.statehealthfacts.org.)  Eligible but uninsured data for New York are for 2003 and for Massachusetts are for 2004.
Massachusetts eligible but uninsured rate is based on a State estimate of 460,000 total uninsured in Massachusetts. New York eligible but uninsured
rate is based on the Current Population Survey estimate of 2.9 million uninsured in New York. (Current Population Survey tabulations prepared for the
United Hospital Fund by the Urban Institute; see also Oakes M, April 2005, Eligible but Uninsured: Challenges to Getting and Keeping MassHealth,
Massachusetts Medicaid Policy Institute.)  Note that estimates of the uninsured and eligible but uninsured rates measured by Massachusetts state 
surveys are lower than those provided here.
Conclusion
Ultimately, universal coverage would eliminate
the most significant source of inequity and
inefficiency from the health care system and
would provide a foundation for making 
large-scale improvements.  Coverage would 
allow formerly uninsured persons to access
services more easily and receive timely and
appropriate care.  Providers would be 
reimbursed directly rather than through 
indirect subsidies, and linking payments to 
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MASSACHUSETTS
Medicaid Expansion
-Children to 300% FPL
-Lift adult enrollment caps
Insurance Connector
-Individuals and small firms only
-Subsidies up to 300% FPL
-Mandatory take-up of employer coverage limits
enrollment in the Connector 
-Limited potential negotiating power
Individual Mandate
-Required to purchase coverage 
(if affordable coverage is available)
-Face penalties for non-enrollment
Employer Requirement
-Modest assessment per worker
Other
-Increase Medicaid rates
-Insurance market reforms
Financing
-Federal matching payments
-Reallocate safety net funds
-Tax surplus
-Employer and family contribution
NEW YORK
(AS MODELED UNDER THREE SCENARIOS)
Medicaid Expansion
-Childless adults to 150% FPL
Insurance Exchange
-Individual buy-in
-Subsidies phase out between 300%-475% FPL
-No waiting period imposed
-Significant enrollment expected and therefore
potential for significant negotiating power
Individual Mandate
-Auto-enrolled into coverage and assessed 
premium owed
-Income-related premium assistance
Employer Requirement
-Ranges from no employer requirement to 8%
payroll tax
Financing
Not specified
Comparing Expansion Strategies in Massachusetts and New York
people would allow for a greater level of 
accountability in the system.  Further, the 
significant enrollment into the Exchange could
make it a vehicle for driving cost control and
quality reforms.  Once all persons are covered,
the state can approach system change to 
achieve the most comprehensive and effective
solutions to the enduring challenges of the
quality and cost of care.  Universal coverage is
a significant achievement in its own right.  It is
also a fundamental step toward realizing a
high-performance health care system.
Appendix A:
New York State Eligibility
Rules and Estimated 
Buy-In Contributions
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* Medicaid and Child Health Plus A eligibility are expressed in net income, while Child Health Plus B and Family Health Plus (FHP) eligibility are
expressed in gross income, as written in HCRA 2000 and Medicaid law. The 2006 Federal Poverty Level (FPL) is $9,800 for an individual and $16,600
for a family of three.
** Children with gross family income above 160% FPL are charged an income-related premium. Premiums for children with gross family income of
160%-222% FPL are $9/month/child up to $27; for children with gross family income of 223%-250% FPL premiums are $15/month/child up to $45.
*** Through March 2005, the Child Health Plus A eligibility level for children ages 6-18 was 133% FPL. Effective April 2005, the Child Health Plus A 
eligibility level for children ages 6-18 was lowered to 100% FPL, at which time children in that age range with gross family income of 100%-133% FPL
who were enrolled in Child Health Plus A were shifted into Child Health Plus B.
† “Parent” is defined as a parent of a child under 21 years who lives in the household. Medicaid eligibility includes disabled adults and 19- and 20-year-
olds with net income up to 87% FPL. FHP eligibility includes 19- and 20-year-olds living with their parents, where gross family income is up to 150% FPL.
†† “Childless adult” is defined as a non-disabled adult age 21 years or over who does not have a child living in the household. FHP eligibility includes 19-
and 20-year-olds not living with their parents, with gross income up to 100% FPL. Income levels for Medicaid eligibility vary by county.
Note: Low-income, uninsured women who are diagnosed with breast or cervical cancer through screenings in New York’s Healthy Women Partnerships
program are eligible for Medicaid coverage. Women must have income levels below 250% FPL to qualify for the screenings.Women and men of child-
bearing age with income up to 200% FPL are eligible for Medicaid Family Planning Services. As of July 2003, disabled workers aged 16-64 with net
income of up to 250% FPL and non-exempt resources of up to $10,000 are eligible for Medicaid coverage through the Medicaid Buy-In for Working
People with Disabilities program (MBIWPD); enrollees with incomes above 150% FPL will eventually be subject to an income-related premium.
Source: United Hospital Fund
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Family Health Plus Buy-In Estimated Annual Contribution Toward Coverage, by
Income, Without Premium Contribution Cap
Income Contribution Contribution ($) Contribution ($)
(% of premium Individual Family of Four
or income)
Parent Childless Adult, 2 Parents and 2 Children
(in household of 2) Age 30+
(in household of 2)
<150% FPL 0% $0 $0 $0
150%-200% FPL 20% of premium $600 $800 $1,200*
(+ CHP B premiums)
201%-250% FPL 35% of premium $1,100 $1,500 $2,200*  
(+ CHP B premiums)
251%-275% FPL 50% of premium $1,500 $2,100 $4,800
276%-300% FPL 75% of premium $2,300 $2,900 $7,200
300% FPL Full premium $3,100 $4,200 $9,600
Note: Estimated annual buy-in premiums are: Child—$1,700; Parent—$3,100; Adult <30—$2,800; Adult 30+—$4,200 (numbers are rounded).
The 2006 federal poverty level is $9,800 for an individual, $13,200 for a family of two, and $20,000 for a family of four.
* For families with income up to 250% FPL, premium estimates are for two parents only. We assume that families with income up to this level would
obtain children’s coverage through CHP B, where premium subsidies would be greater than the subsidies in the FHP buy-in. Annual CHP B premiums
for two children range from $0-$216 at 150%-200% FPL and from $216-$360 at 200%-250% FPL, depending on income (see notes to eligibility chart
for CHP B premiums). Above 250% FPL, we assumed that children would be enrolled in the FHP buy-in; however, the full CHP B premium may be
less expensive than the subsidized FHP buy-in premium for families in some parts of the state.
Family Health Plus Buy-In Estimated Annual Contribution Toward Coverage, by
Income, With Premium Contribution Cap
Income Contribution Contribution ($) Contribution ($)
(% of premium Individual Family of Four
or income)
Parent Childless Adult, 2 Parents and 2 Children
(in household of 2) Age 30+
(in household of 2)
<150% FPL 0% $0 $0 $0
150%-200% FPL 20% of premium $600 $800 $1,200*
(up to 8% of income) (+ CHP B premiums)
201%-250% FPL 35% of premium $1,100 $1,500 $2,200*
(up to 8% of income) (+ CHP B premiums)
251%-275% FPL 50% of premium $1,500 $2,100 $4,000-$4,400
(up to 8% of income)
276%-300% FPL 75% of premium $2,300 $2,900-$3,100 $4,400-$4,800
(up to 8% of income)
301%-400% FPL 8% of income $3,100 $3,200-$4,200 $4,800-$6,400
>400% FPL 10% of income $3,100 $4,200 $8,000-$9,600
Note: Estimated annual buy-in premiums are: Child—$1,700; Parent—$3,100; Adult <30—$2,800; Adult 30+—$4,200 (numbers are rounded).
The 2006 federal poverty level is $9,800 for an individual, $13,200 for a family of two, and $20,000 for a family of four.
* For families with income up to 250% FPL, premium estimates are for two parents only. We assume that families with income up to this level would
obtain children’s coverage through CHP B, where premium subsidies would be greater than the subsidies in the FHP buy-in. Annual CHP B premiums
for two children range from $0-$216 at 150%-200% FPL and from $216-$360 at 200%-250% FPL, depending on income (see notes to eligibility chart
for CHP B premiums). Above 250% FPL, we assumed that children would be enrolled in the FHP buy-in; however, the full CHP B premium may be
less expensive than the subsidized FHP buy-in premium for families in some parts of the state.
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Appendix B: Modeling
Assumptions in Brief
In order to interpret the modeling results, it is
important to understand the underlying
assumptions.  A more detailed description of
these assumptions and results, including data
on wage effects, is included in the report of
The Lewin Group.*  We briefly describe the
key assumptions here.  
Individual voluntary participation 
assumptions are based upon an analysis of
public program participation rates and price
elasticity estimates.  Employer decisions of
whether or not to offer coverage directly are
based on cost-benefit analyses and composite
price elasticity estimates.  
Employers offer coverage to attract and
retain workers and employees ultimately “pay”
for employer-sponsored insurance (ESI)
through reduced wages.  Employers’ decisions
regarding whether or not to offer coverage
directly were modeled based on an assessment
of what would be best for their employees:
ESI or the FHP buy-in.  The employer’s
decision is modeled based on the cost of ESI
to the workforce through reduced wages (the
premium less the tax exclusion on ESI) 
compared with the cost of covering workers in
the FHP buy-in (FHP premium less subsidies)
plus a “penalty” (either a “modest assessment”
or 8 percent payroll contribution), if applicable. 
However, the decision of whether or not an
employer offers coverage directly or individuals
choose ESI over FHP (including the FHP buy-
in) is not strictly an economic one.  Ultimately,
this decision is estimated using price elasticity
estimates based on worker characteristics.
Simply stated, firms employing primarily
younger and healthier workers will be more
price sensitive than firms employing older and
sicker workers, who will be less price sensitive
and therefore more likely to retain ESI. 
The result is that, in general, higher-income
workers are found to prefer ESI because of the
associated tax benefits and because they are
not eligible for the FHP subsidies.  Lower-
income workers are found to prefer the FHP
buy-in because the subsidies make this more
cost-effective.  
The same assumptions about employer and
employee behavior are used in all of the policy
scenarios.  An important distinction between
the different mandatory scenarios is the 
presence and scale of an employer assessment
for not offering coverage: there is no 
assessment on employers under the individual
mandate, a small assessment under the modest
employer assessment, and a relatively large
assessment under the pay-or-play scenario. 
As discussed above, the modeling assumes
that employees pay for coverage through
reduced wages. If the cost of insurance for
employers increases, it is assumed that wages
decrease.  Conversely, if the employer’s cost of
insurance declines, wages would rise.  The
modeling projects a reduction in employer 
coverage and costs under all scenarios, and
that, over time, these savings would be passed
back to workers in the form of wage increases.
These estimated wage effects would likely play
out over the first two years of the program.
The cost estimates presented in this report do
not include the wage effects associated with
these policy changes.**  When wage effects
are included, employers realize no net savings
because these savings are passed back to 
workers. (As a result, families are estimated to
save between $1 billion and $2 billion overall
under the three universal coverage scenarios.)
The state would still face increased costs 
(estimated to be between $4 billion and $6 
billion under the three universal coverage 
scenarios), which could be funded through
increased federal funds, redirecting current
spending, and/or raising revenues.  
* See The Lewin Group, December 2006, Estimates of the Cost and
Coverage Impacts of Proposals to Expand Health Insurance Coverage in New
York, prepared for the United Hospital Fund and The Commonwealth
Fund. Available online at www.uhfnyc.org
** Note: Some of the estimates provided here differ from those in The
Lewin Group report. We did not include offsets for safety net subsidies
or Healthy New York program savings because we consider these to be
potential state savings. We also did not include adjustments for wage
effects because we consider these to be long-term effects. Finally, we did
not include savings to the state when government employees shift from
ESI to FHP, because such enrollment is not permitted under New York
State law.
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1 For the purposes of this report, we describe a 98% coverage rate as
“universal” coverage.
2 See The Lewin Group, December 2006, Estimates of the Cost and
Coverage Impacts of Proposals to Expand Health Insurance Coverage in
New York, prepared for the United Hospital Fund and The
Commonwealth Fund. Available online at www.uhfnyc.org..
3 Family Health Plus is an expansion of New York’s Medicaid program,
for single adults with income up to 100% of the federal poverty level
(FPL) and for parents with income up to 150% FPL. It has a more 
limited benefit package than the traditional Medicaid program. Child
Health Plus refers to the public health insurance programs for children
in New York, Child Health Plus A (CHP A) and Child Health Plus B
(CHP B). CHP A is the state’s Medicaid program for children; CHP B is
New York’s State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). See
Appendix A for CHP A and CHP B income eligibility levels.
4 The Lewin Group estimates of coverage distribution for New York
State are based on 2005 Current Population Survey, Annual Social and
Economic Survey data trended forward to 2006. Baseline coverage
data include adjustment for under-reporting of Medicaid coverage.
5 United Hospital Fund analysis of tabulations of the 2001-2006 Current
Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Survey, prepared by the
Urban Institute for the United Hospital Fund.
6 United Hospital Fund analysis of county-level New York State
Insurance Department standardized health plan premium data. Data
accessed at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/ihmoindx.htm. For example,
between March 2003 and October 2006, the average direct-pay 
individual and family HMO premiums in New York City rose by
approximately 60%. The average individual HMO premium in New
York City rose from $442 to $704 per month during this period, while
the average family premium rose from $1,312 to $2,119 per month.
For direct-pay Point of Service (POS) plans in New York City, the 
average individual premium rose by approximately 67% over this 
period, from $599 to $1,000 per month, and the average family POS
premium rose by 26%, from $1,863 to $2,917 per month.
7 A United Hospital Fund study found that, in 2001, 42% of children in
Child Health Plus B were disenrolled at renewal, and two-thirds who
did not renew coverage in 2001 were enrolled a year later  (see
Birnbaum M and D Holahan, 2003, Renewing Coverage in New York’s
Child Health Plus B Program: Retention Rates and Enrollee Experiences,
United Hospital Fund). Another study, from The Commonwealth Fund,
found that 93% of children remain eligible for Child Health Plus B cov-
erage at the time of recertification, despite the fact that the disenroll-
ment rate is approximately 50% (see Lipson K, E Fishman, P Boozang,
D Bachrach, 2003, Rethinking Recertification: Keeping Eligible Individuals
Enrolled in New York’s Public Health Insurance Programs,The
Commonwealth Fund).
8 The Lewin Group estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation
Model, 2006. In 2006, 300% of the federal poverty level is $29,400 for
an individual and $49,800 for a family of three.
9 In 2006, 300% FPL for a family of three is $49,800, while the average
cost of a family health insurance premium for an HMO plan in the
direct pay market in New York City is more than $25,000. This 
premium represents nearly one-half of the family’s income, clearly an
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